Monetary Policy and the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates by Robert Amano & Malik Shukayev
Monetary Policy and the Zero Bound 
on Nominal Interest Rates
Robert Amano and Malik Shukayev, Canadian Economic Analysis 
•  The recent ﬁ  nancial crisis and the ensuing 
  recession brought renewed focus to the issue of 
monetary policy options when the interest rate is 
at or near zero.
•  The objective of this article is to better understand 
how different types of monetary policy frameworks 
might help to lower the risk and cost of hitting the 
zero bound on nominal interest rates.
•  When the policy interest rate is at or near its zero 
bound, an important tool for a central bank’s 
stabilization policy is its inﬂ  uence over inﬂ  ation 
expectations, and thereby real interest rates.
• Inﬂ  ation targeting is a monetary framework that 
allows a central bank to inﬂ  uence inﬂ  ation expect-
ations, but in extreme circumstances, its inﬂ  uence 
may not be enough to avoid an economic slow-
down. Inﬂ  ation targeting augmented by a condi-
tional commitment to a future course of policy may 
strengthen the inﬂ  uence of central bank actions on 
the economy.
•  Alternatively, a credible price-level-targeting 
regime can better exploit inﬂ  ation expectations, 
reduce the likelihood of hitting the zero bound, 
and lessen the economic costs of operating at 
the lower bound, while keeping long-term inﬂ  ation 
expectations ﬁ  xed on a target rate. Moreover, 
price-level targeting may offer better stabilization 
properties than an inﬂ  ation-targeting framework.
W
hile the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal 
interest rates has always been an issue of 
underlying importance for monetary policy, 
its prominence has ebbed and ﬂ  owed. During the 1990s, 
when Japan experienced a long period with a policy 
interest rate near zero, deﬂ  ation, and weak economic 
performance, the issue received considerable attention. 
Based on this work and other experiences with the 
zero bound, the general view at the Bank of Canada 
in 2006, when the inﬂ  ation-control agreement was 
renewed, was that episodes of operating at the zero 
bound were probably rare and manageable.
1 The 
Bank was not alone in this view. In a paper presented 
at the 2009 Jackson Hole Symposium on Financial 
Stability and Macroeconomic Policy, Carl Walsh sum-
marized the general view before the crisis as follows, 
“In fact, most work suggests that the costs of the 
ZLB are quite small if the central bank enjoys a high 
level of credibility” (Walsh 2009, 10). The ﬁ  nancial 
crisis of 2008 and its aftermath have brought these 
tentative conclusions into question. 
Indeed, in the aftermath of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, the 
outlook for global economic growth deteriorated 
signiﬁ  cantly, and central banks in many advanced 
countries lowered their policy interest rates to historic 
lows. For example, by December 2009, the U.S. fed-
eral funds rate sat at 0.12 per cent, while in England, 
Switzerland, and Japan nominal interest rates were at 
0.45, 0.25, and 0.10 per cent, respectively. At the same 
time, a number of central banks engaged in uncon-
ventional monetary policy, such as “credit easing,” 
aimed at reducing risk premiums and improving 
liquidity and trading activity in ﬁ  nancial markets that 
were temporarily impaired, and “quantitative easing,” 
aimed at lowering longer-term rates on government or 
private assets and improving the availability of credit 
1  This view was supported by several model-based simulation studies, such as Black, 
Coletti, and Monnier (1998). Other studies can be found in Amirault and O’Reilly (2001).
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real interest rate is 2 per cent. So, in periods of eco-
nomic weakness, the central bank could lower its 
policy interest rate ( ) to, say, 2 per cent to induce 
the real interest rate ( ) to fall to zero and thereby 
encourage economic activity. In extreme circum-
stances, such as the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis, a negative 
real interest rate might be required to avert an eco-
nomic slump. The central bank cannot reduce its 
policy interest rate below zero, however. So, in this 
example, it is impossible for the central bank to achieve 
a real interest rate lower than -2 per cent, even though 
the economic situation may call for a lower real interest 
rate.
3 In such a situation, the real interest rate is too 
high, and monetary policy is said to be facing a 
binding zero constraint on nominal interest rates.
In extreme circumstances, such as 
the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis, a negative 
real interest rate might be required to 
avert an economic slump.
The savings and investment decisions of households 
and ﬁ  rms are not based on the real policy interest rate 
but on broader market interest rates. Examples of 
these broader rates include those on variable rate 
mortgages and commercial paper, etc. With some 
simpliﬁ  cation, a representative real market interest 
rate ( ) can be written as:
  , (2)
where the term   captures various risk and liquidity 
premiums that lead to a credit spread between 
market and policy interest rates. Moreover, households 
and ﬁ  rms often use multi-period ﬁ  nancial instruments, 
such as ﬁ  xed-rate mortgages or long-term bonds, to 
conduct their business. A  -period real market 
interest rate may be loosely written as:
  , (3)
3  In theory, nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero, since rational agents would not 
purchase an asset yielding a negative nominal return when they could hold currency 
at a zero rate of return. In practice, however, most central banks have stopped short 
of lowering policy interest rates to zero in order to preserve the efﬁ  cient functioning of 
short-term ﬁ  nancial markets. For instance, the Bank of Canada considers that 25 basis 
points is the effective lower bound for the overnight target rate.
more generally in the economy.
2 In Canada, the Bank 
of Canada substantially expanded its short-term 
lending facilities in order to increase liquidity in the 
ﬁ  nancial system and to support credit ﬂ  ows, and then 
moved aggressively to lower its overnight target rate, 
bringing it to 0.25 per cent in April 2009. At that time, 
the Bank also made a commitment, conditional on the 
outlook for inﬂ  ation, to keep the overnight rate at that 
level until the end of the second quarter of 2010. To 
buttress its commitment, the Bank expanded the 
terms of its short-term lending facilities to correspond 
to the length of its conditional commitment. These 
events, as well as similar experiences around the world, 
have renewed the focus on the issue of monetary 
policy when the interest rate is at or near zero.
The purpose of this article is not to review these 
recent experiences, but rather to explore how dif-
ferent types of monetary policy frameworks might 
help central banks to lower the risk of hitting the ZLB 
on nominal interest rates and to reduce the economic 
costs of being at the ZLB. The ﬁ  rst section presents 
an analytical framework for thinking about monetary 
policy and the zero bound on nominal interest rates, 
as well as the key role of inﬂ  ation expectations in 
lowering the real interest rate. The next section dis-
cusses the role that different monetary policy frame-
works might play in inﬂ  uencing inﬂ  ation expectations, 
and in avoiding or minimizing time spent at the zero 
bound.
Monetary Policy Transmission: 
From Policy Rates to Real 
Economic Activity 
Discussions regarding the Bank of Canada’s monetary 
policy often centre on the target overnight rate, but it 
is important to bear in mind that the real interest rate 
is the key variable inﬂ  uencing the behaviour of house-
holds and ﬁ  rms, and thus aggregate demand. The real 
interest rate is deﬁ  ned as the nominal interest rate 
less expected inﬂ  ation. That is,
  . (1)
As an example, if we assume that inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions ( ) are anchored on a 2 per cent inﬂ  ation target, 
2  There are no universally accepted deﬁ  nitions of credit easing or quantitative easing. 
The deﬁ  nitions used here are taken from the Bank of Canada’s framework for monetary 
policy at low interest rates (Annex to the April 2009 Bank of Canada Monetary Policy 
Report). 
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inﬂ  ation target by clearly communicating future mon-
etary policy actions or “forward guidance” (see 
Eggertsson and Woodford 2003 and Walsh 2009). In 
particular, a central bank could commit to maintain a 
“low” interest rate policy even after rates rise from the 
zero bound. The commitment to hold the policy rate 
low for a longer period than under normal economic 
conditions, would lead to strong economic growth 
and higher anticipated inﬂ  ation.
4 In the real world, a 
number of central banks implemented the idea of 
forward guidance or conditional commitment but in a 
different manner. Instead of attempting to raise inﬂ  ation 
expectations, central banks sought to lower interest 
rates further along the yield curve by providing more 
certainty about policy rates over an extended period, 
while maintaining inﬂ  ation expectations ﬁ  rmly anchored 
at the inﬂ  ation target. A number of central banks 
enhanced their communications regarding the future 
path of the policy interest rate and made conditional 
commitments to hold the policy interest rates at 
or near zero over a speciﬁ  ed period. For instance, 
the Bank of Canada, in the statement accompanying 
its April 2009 ﬁ  xed announcement date wrote, 
“Conditional on the outlook for inﬂ  ation, the target 
overnight rate can be expected to remain at its current 
level until the end of the second quarter of 2010 in 
order to achieve the inﬂ  ation target.” Similarly, the 
Sveriges Riksbank in their July 2009 Monetary Policy 
Report wrote, “The repo rate is expected to remain at 
this low level over the coming year.”
Central banks sought to lower interest 
rates further along the yield curve by 
providing more certainty about policy 
rates over an extended period,
while maintaining inﬂ  ation expectations 
ﬁ  rmly anchored at the inﬂ  ation target.
The preliminary evidence, at least in Canada, has 
been quite positive, as market participants embodied 
the conditional commitment on policy interest rates in 
market interest rates. Indeed, according to empirical 
work conducted by He (forthcoming), the Bank of 
4  The efﬁ  cacy of these types of forward-guidance measures is still in question. Levin 
et al. (2009), for example, use results based on a small macroeconomic model to 
argue that forward guidance alone may not be sufﬁ  cient in the presence of a large and 
persistent shock. In contrast, Giannoni (2009) argues that forward guidance is, indeed, 
effective in his model. In fact, the best possible outcome in the Levin et al. paper can be 
achieved only with forward guidance.
where   is a  -period real interest rate,   is an 
expected one-period real interest rate   periods in the 
future, and   captures the term premium. This equa-
tion says that the  -period real interest rate comprises 
a series of expected one-period interest rates and a 
term premium, and by using different values of  , the 
equation traces the term structure of real interest 
rates. During the ﬁ  nancial crisis, the credit spread 
and term premiums were unusually large, owing to 
illiquidity in credit markets and a perceived increase 
in risk.
According to equations (2) and (3), there are three 
ways to lower real market interest rates when the 
policy rate is at its lower bound. First, central banks 
can try to reduce the credit spread. Indeed, in the 
aftermath of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, central banks imple-
mented measures to improve the functioning of 
  ﬁ  nancial markets, with the goal of reducing spreads 
and thereby helping to lower market interest rates. 
Second, central banks can attempt to lower the term 
premium. In fact, several central banks undertook 
“quantitative easing” in an effort to lower the yields on 
multi-period ﬁ  nancial instruments and thus stimulate 
economic activity. The third channel—and the focus 
of this Review article—is for central banks to attempt 
to inﬂ  uence the expected path of future interest rates 
and inﬂ  ation expectations.
The efﬁ  cacy of the attempts to reduce credit spreads 
and lower yields on multi-period ﬁ  nancial instruments 
is currently being debated. Indeed, some academics 
and central bank economists, such as Eggertsson 
and Woodford (2003) and Carlstrom and Pescatori 
(2009), have questioned the relevance of these mon-
etary policy measures when standard monetary 
policy is able to inﬂ  uence inﬂ  ation expectations. As 
with many economic debates, it will take time to 
fully assess the effectiveness of these unconventional 
measures, and many open questions remain 
regarding the costs of exiting from these unconven-
tional policies.
There is, however, little debate that when the policy 
interest rate is at or near its zero bound, the central 
bank’s inﬂ  uence over inﬂ  ation expectations is an 
important tool. How this inﬂ  uence should be used is 
a critical question for monetary policy, since it may 
require raising inﬂ  ation expectations above an inﬂ  ation 
objective for a period of time in order to achieve a 
sufﬁ  ciently lower real interest rate. In other words, a 
central bank may need to convince households and 
ﬁ  rms that it will temporarily exceed its inﬂ  ation objective 
but, at the same time, maintain its credibility and 
commitment to low and stable inﬂ  ation. In principle, 
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be in question, owing to uncertainty about its tem-
porary status, and this implies that a central bank’s 
ability to inﬂ  uence short-run inﬂ  ation expectations 
could be compromised, resulting in less inﬂ  uence 
over real interest rates.
An inﬂ  ation anchor is essential, 
especially when providing extraordinary 
guidance to markets.
The preceding paragraphs should not be interpreted 
as an argument against inﬂ  ation targeting. In fact, a 
credible inﬂ  ation target, at a low positive rate, helps to 
ensure that inﬂ  ation expectations remain well anchored, 
allowing for negative real interest rates. As Carney 
(2009) notes, an inﬂ  ation anchor is essential, especially 
when providing extraordinary guidance to markets.
6
The one disadvantage of inﬂ  ation targeting at the 
ZLB is that a period of below-target inﬂ  ation will be 
followed by inﬂ  ation returning to and staying at its 
target value. That is, the central bank does not 
attempt to compensate for a period of inﬂ  ation below 
the target with a period of above-target inﬂ  ation. 
Rational households and ﬁ  rms would, therefore, 
expect inﬂ  ation to be below the target in the short run 
and to be equal to the inﬂ  ation target in the longer run. 
The implication of this behaviour is that average inﬂ  a-
tion expectations would be lower than the inﬂ  ation 
target, making it difﬁ  cult for an inﬂ  ation-targeting 
central bank to raise inﬂ  ation expectations.
Despite this difﬁ  culty, some research has found that 
optimal forms of inﬂ  ation targeting may be sufﬁ  cient 
to avoid the zero bound. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2007) study the zero-bound problem in a medium-
scale dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) 
model with distortionary taxes and three shocks: one 
to aggregate productivity, one to investment-speciﬁ  c 
productivity, and one to government spending. Their 
model is calibrated to U.S. data and shows that under 
the optimal policy, the probability of the nominal 
interest rate approaching the zero bound is practically 
nil. Similarly, Christiano (2004) shows that, in a small 
macroeconomic model, an implausibly large eco-
nomic shock is required to bring interest rates close 
6  In cross-country empirical work, de Carvalho Filho (2010) ﬁ  nds that inﬂ  ation-targeting 
central banks seem to generate better-anchored inﬂ  ation expectations, even in the 
immediate aftermath of a ﬁ  nancial crisis.
Canada’s conditional commitment appears to have 
resulted in a persistent lowering of Canadian interest 
rates since April 2009, relative to what would have 
been expected without it.
In the remainder of this article, we discuss approaches 
that may help a monetary authority temporarily raise 
inﬂ  ation expectations while maintaining its credibility 
as an advocate of low inﬂ  ation.
Monetary Policy at the 
Zero Bound
Inﬂ  ation targeting
One way to lower the real interest rate, when one is at 
or close to the ZLB, might be to raise the target rate of 
inﬂ  ation on a permanent basis. This may raise inﬂ  ation 
expectations and work its way through ﬁ  nancial markets 
via equations (1) to (3). For instance, John Williams 
(2009) has argued that the U. S. Federal Reserve 
should increase its implicit inﬂ  ation objective from 
the 2 per cent currently viewed by market partici-
pants, to something between 2 and 4 per cent to 
minimize the chances of hitting the ZLB and reducing 
the economic costs associated with those occasions 
when it is hit. An IMF staff position paper by Blanchard, 
Dell’Aricca, and Mauro (2010) seems to support this 
conclusion, urging more research on the beneﬁ  ts 
of raising the inﬂ  ation target from 2 to 4 per cent. 
In reply, opponents such as Deputy Governor 
Charles Bean of the Bank of England have written, 
“This is misguided. Aside from the dubious morality 
of redistributing wealth from savers to borrowers, we 
have seen from past experience that a bit of inﬂ  ation 
has a nasty habit of turning into a lot of inﬂ  ation.” 
5 
Bean’s warning echoes that of former Bank of Canada 
Governor John Crow (2009, 12): “I did not think that 
4 per cent was a credible goal because I did not think 
that economic agents would believe that the authorities 
would stick to a number that promised, essentially, 
“inﬂ  ation.” That is to say, if 4 was okay, why not 5, 
why not 6, and so on?”
Rogoff (2008) has suggested that central banks should 
temporarily raise inﬂ  ation targets in an effort to lower 
real interest rates and ameliorate debt problems. 
While an increase in inﬂ  ation could certainly help to 
deleverage an economy, it would also entail the cost 
of undermining public trust by inducing an ad hoc 
redistribution of wealth from savers to borrowers. 
5  See Bean (2010). Empirical magnitudes of this redistribution effect for Canada can be 
found in Meh, Ríos-Rull, and Terajima (2010).
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of reaching the ZLB on nominal interest rates, or at 
least reduces the economic costs associated with 
being there. Moreover, as Carney (2009) notes, price-
level targeting may offer an additional beneﬁ  t: since 
price-level targeting provides clear guidance on the 
expected price level, it may serve as a better anchor 
for inﬂ  ation expectations than an inﬂ  ation target 
during a ﬁ  nancial crisis. This feature of price-level 
targeting gives the central bank more latitude to 
pursue other immediate concerns, such as ﬁ  nancial 
stability, without compromising its monetary policy 
objective of maintaining price stability.
7 Price-level 
targeting resolves the inherent uncertainty about how 
temporary higher inﬂ  ation would be.
Since price-level targeting provides 
clear guidance on the expected price 
level, it may serve as a better anchor for 
inﬂ  ation expectations than an inﬂ  ation 
target during a ﬁ  nancial crisis. It also 
resolves the inherent uncertainty about 
how temporary higher inﬂ  ation would be.
Amano and Ambler (2010) compare inﬂ  ation targeting 
and price-level targeting under low trend inﬂ  ation in a 
small, calibrated, DSGE model that explicitly takes 
into account the ZLB. Their conclusions, based on a 
solution method that allows for the effects of time-
varying price dispersion and valid welfare compari-
sons, are fourfold: (i) Price-level targeting is more 
effective than inﬂ  ation targeting in keeping an economy 
away from the zero bound on nominal interest rates; 
(ii) An economy under inﬂ  ation targeting can remain 
stuck at the lower bound for prolonged periods; 
(iii) Price-level targeting allows an economy to reap 
the beneﬁ  ts of lower inﬂ  ation while avoiding the risks 
of being stuck at the zero bound; and (iv) Price-level 
targeting yields a higher level of economic welfare 
than inﬂ  ation targeting. While these conclusions are 
informative, the results do not allow us to draw any 
quantitative conclusions. 
Murchison (forthcoming) examines the ability of inﬂ  a-
tion targeting and price-level targeting to mitigate the 
effects of the zero bound on nominal interest rates in 
ToTEM, a large-scale model of a small open economy 
7  This idea is explored in forthcoming work by Christensen, Meh, and Moran.
to zero. All of these studies, however, predate the 
latest ﬁ  nancial crisis.
Recent experience would appear to contradict these 
predictions: inﬂ  ation targeting has not been sufﬁ  cient 
to avoid the zero bound. One reason may be that the 
shock was much larger than is considered within the 
bounds of normal. Amano and Shukayev (2009) pro-
pose an alternative explanation. They argue that the 
addition of a historically measured risk-premium 
shock to a medium-scale DSGE model speciﬁ  ed 
along similar lines to that in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2007) is sufﬁ  cient to make the ZLB a binding con-
straint on monetary policy. In the model, the risk 
premium is deﬁ  ned as the returns on private assets 
(which have a time-varying risk component) less those 
on risk-free government bonds. Intuition for the “spe-
cial” role of risk-premium shocks can be garnered 
from the observation that these shocks change the 
spread between the expected rate of return on capital 
and the risk-free rate. To accommodate the higher risk 
premium, this implies that either the expected rate of 
return on capital must increase, or the risk-free rate 
must fall, or both. For a wide range of plausible par-
ameter conﬁ  gurations and inﬂ  ation-targeting rules, 
Amano and Shukayev ﬁ  nd that much of the increase 
in the risk premium is accommodated by a drop in 
the risk-free rate, thus increasing the probability of 
reaching the zero bound.
Price-level targeting
A credible price-level-targeting regime has an 
important advantage over inﬂ  ation targeting when the 
policy interest rate is at or near zero. Unlike inﬂ  ation 
targeting, price-level targeting is “history dependent,” 
which means that periods of below-target inﬂ  ation 
will be followed by periods of above-target inﬂ  ation 
(to return the price level to its target). So, under price-
level targeting, long-run inﬂ  ation expectations will be 
stable, but short-term inﬂ  ation expectations will rise or 
fall, depending on the current position of the price 
level relative to its target. If prices are currently below 
their target level, then short-term expectations of 
inﬂ  ation will rise above the long-run average inﬂ  ation 
rate. Thus, price-level targeting has a built-in mech-
anism to raise and lower expectations of inﬂ  ation.
Many researchers, including Coulombe (1998), 
Duguay (1994), Svensson (2001), Wolman (2005), 
Amano and Ambler (2010), and Murchison (forth-
coming), have noted the beneﬁ  ts of price-level tar-
geting when the policy interest rate is at or near zero. 
In particular, these authors demonstrate that the 
ability of price-level targeting to inﬂ  uence inﬂ  ation 
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form expectations. Williams ﬁ  nds that imperfect know-
ledge, especially about monetary policy, can under-
mine the effectiveness of price-level targeting in 
dealing with the effects of the lower bound. 
Interestingly, effective communication about monetary 
policy can reduce the costs associated with being at 
the zero bound, suggesting that forward guidance 
may, indeed, be a useful tool for dealing with the lower 
bound, even if a central bank practices price-level 
targeting.
Concluding Remarks
The zero bound on nominal interest rates is undeni-
ably a concern for monetary policy-makers, but the 
problems that it raises are not insurmountable. When 
the ZLB is a binding constraint, it implies that the real 
interest rate is “too high.” Therefore, creating expecta-
tions of higher inﬂ  ation could be a powerful mech-
anism for mitigating the effects of the zero bound on 
an economy. Under inﬂ  ation targeting, communicating 
future monetary policy actions, or forward guidance, 
may be an effective way to raise inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions. Alternatively, research has shown that a credible 
price-level-targeting framework can reduce the likeli-
hood of reaching the ZLB and lessen the costs of 
operating at the lower bound on an economy. 
Moreover, price-level targeting may help a central 
bank to address a ﬁ  nancial-stability concern while 
keeping expectations of inﬂ  ation anchored on its 
long-run objective. For price-level targeting to admit 
these beneﬁ  ts, the assumption of credibility is crucial: 
with diminished credibility, the effectiveness of price-
level targeting in offsetting the effects of the zero 
bound falls. Clear central bank communication about 
monetary policy, however, may help to overcome the 
reduced effectiveness of price-level targeting arising 
from imperfect credibility or imperfect knowledge of 
the economy.
calibrated to replicate important features of the 
Canadian economy. As such, this work can offer 
quantitative insights into the stabilization properties 
of the two targeting regimes when faced with the zero 
bound. The simulation results indicate that, relative to 
a version of the model without the zero bound, eco-
nomic loss increases by about 2 per cent under an 
optimized inﬂ  ation-targeting rule, whereas under an 
optimized price-level-targeting rule, the increase in 
loss is less than 1 per cent.
8
In a recent paper, Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and 
Wieland (2010) compare inﬂ  ation and price-level tar-
geting in a New Keynesian model where the effects of 
trend inﬂ  ation on the steady-state dynamics and loss 
function of the model are explicitly modelled. Since 
the model is micro-founded, it admits a welfare func-
tion that allows the authors to engage in normative 
analysis. The authors report many results, but the 
most striking is that price-level targeting raises welfare 
by a non-trivial amount for any steady-state rate of 
inﬂ  ation. Moreover, by reducing the variance of inﬂ  a-
tion and output, price-level targeting lowers the fre-
quency of zero-bound episodes.
9
An important caveat to the results stated above 
regarding the apparent efﬁ  cacy of price-level tar-
geting is the assumption that it is fully credible. If 
households and ﬁ  rms do not understand the new 
framework or believe that the central bank will always 
follow a price-level-targeting rule, then its powerful 
effect on expectations of inﬂ  ation will be dampened. 
To explore the implications of this key assumption, 
Cateau and Dorich (forthcoming) study a situation 
where the monetary authority shifts from inﬂ  ation 
targeting to price-level targeting when the zero bound 
is hit. As expected, they ﬁ  nd that price-level targeting 
works well under perfect credibility, but when imper-
fect credibility is introduced the effectiveness of 
price-level targeting is reduced. According to their 
qualitative results, greater degrees of imperfect cred-
ibility will increasingly reduce the ability of price-level 
targeting to help an economy avoid the zero bound on 
nominal interest rates.
Williams (2006) uses a macroeconomic model where 
economic agents have imperfect knowledge of their 
economy (including monetary policy) to study the 
impact of learning on the effectiveness of price-level 
targeting at the ZLB. Owing to the absence of com-
plete information, households and ﬁ  rms must 
8  Economic loss is calculated as the sum of the variance of inﬂ  ation and the variance of 
the output gap, multiplied by half the variance of the change in the policy interest rate.
9  In addition, Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Wieland ﬁ  nd that price-level targeting also 
leads to a lower level of optimal inﬂ  ation relative to inﬂ  ation targeting.
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